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Mediatization as a Challenge: 
Media Logic Versus Political Logic 
Frank Esser 
Political communication ls a precondition of democracy, and democracy 
depends heavily on the infrastructure of the media system (see 
chapters 1 and 2). The media and mediated communication are of 
central relevance for contemporary societies due to their decisive influ-
ence on, and consequences for, political institutions, political actors, 
and individual citizens. Political actors have learnt to accept that their 
behavior to a significant extent is influenced by the rules of the game set 
by the mass media. This transformation has been described as a shift to 
audience democracy (Manin 1995) or media democracy Uarren 2008a). 
The idea of media democracy is an extension of the model of represen-
tative democracy (see Chapter 3). It refers to a development that at its 
beginning aimed to make politics more inclusive and transparent. In the 
process policy-makers have become accountable to an ever growing vol-
ume of interests and demands from the public - not only in the context 
of elections but in many phases of the policy process. The pressure on 
policy-makers to be responsive to public opinion in general and special 
interests in particular has increased the role of the mass media in many 
ways. Politicians have grown to rely on the mass media for gauging pub-
lic opinion (using media coverage as a proxy for public sentiments), and 
for generating attention, acceptance, and legitimation of their actions 
(using media channels for public presentation of politics). 
Theoretically associated with the concept of media democracy is the 
notion of a media society (Mazzoleni 2008c). This idea implies that tra-
ditional mass media, as well as the new online media, are pervading 
all spheres of social life and have thus become the central precondi-
tion of exchanges and interactions among individuals and organizations 
of society. The media society can be seen as the result of a process of 
functional differentiation making the media increasingly independent 
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of their former sponsors, which were, in the European tradition, pri-
marily the churches and the political parties Oarren 2008a). The media 
now operate according to a specific media logic and, due to economic 
necessities, are guided by commercial rules in order to maximize their 
audience shares. 
This transformation process toward greater media dependency is 
accompanied by critical undertones. This is particularly true with regard 
to potential transformations of democratic politics as a result of media-
tization processes. Critics worry that the media may interfere with the 
'chain of responsibility' and the 'chain of accountability' in irrespon-
sible ways (see the model of representative democracy in Chapter 3). 
With regard to the former, the media may cause traditional institu-
tions of preference mobilization and preference aggregation (like parties, 
parliaments) to decline; and with regard to the latter they may pres-
surize political actors to succumb to the specific operating logic of the 
news media when justifying their actions to the public. By assuming the 
role of an alternative public's representative, the media see it as their 
responsibili ty to scrutinize and evaluate politicians and their actions. 
They do so by their own media specific standards, and may, for example, 
'sanction' them with bad press. The media legitimize their increasingly 
proactive political involvement with reference to democratic expec-
tations such as providing 'transparency', contributing to 'checks and 
balances', and vitalizing the 'public sphere'. However, on the other 
hand, the media themselves are hard to 'sanction' themselves in case 
of negative consequences. This can pose a challenge to democracy, as 
argued by Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 248): 
While the political parties are accountable for their policies to the 
electorate, no constitution foresees that the media be accountable for 
their actions. Absence of accountability can imply serious risks for 
democracy, because it violates the classic rule of balances of power in 
the democratic game, making the media (the fourth branch of govern-
ment) an influential and uncontrollable force that is protected from 
the sanction of popular will. 
Within the model of representative democracy the mass media have 
become an omnipresent, highly consequential 'environmental factor' 
that sometimes irritates, interferes, or even obstructs political processes. 
At the same time the media expand the repertoire of action for politi-
cians who try to use the media to their advantage. The opportunity 
structures for a growing relevance of the media in politics do not follow 
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internationally uniform developments and are subject to conditional 
factors. The concept of 'mediatization of politics' serves as a context-
sensitive tool for addressing the question of where media intrusion 
endangers the functioning of the democratic process, and where it may 
enhance it. This chapter lays out a theoretical framework of mediati-
zation of politics whereas the following Chapter 8 reports empirical 
findings from projects currently underway within the National Com-
petence Center of Research on Challenges to Democracy in the 21st 
century (NCCR Democracy, Zurich). 
Mediation and mediatization 
Before addressing specific challenges to democracy it is important to 
place the mediatization of politics in context and illustrate its new qual-
ity. Scholars differentiate it from mediation of politics, which is an older 
concept that refers to the overall difference that media make by being 
there in the political world (McQuail 2010: 8~86). In the context of 
political communication, mediation is primarily used to denote the 
neutral act of transmitting messages through the media, and experienc-
ing politics through mass communication channels (Mazzoleni 2008b; 
Stromback 2008). When politics has become mediated, people depend 
on the media for information about politics. The media have long acted 
as a mediator between the citizenry on the one hand, and the institu-
tions involved in government, elections, and opinion formation on the 
other. The media also mediate between different actors and institutions 
within the governing or political communication system more broadly. 
In fact, as Lucian Pye (1993: 443) put it, 'political life in any mass society 
is impossible without established methods of political communication.' 
Some scholars have long argued that to a certain extent politics is com-
munication (Deutsch 1963). Almond and Powell argued already in 1966 
that 'communication pervades the entire political process' (p. 80) and 
noted that all functions performed in the political system - political 
socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, 
rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication - are performed by 
means of communication. For example, the preferences of citizens must 
be articulated by communication and are channeled into institutions 
of preference aggregation by mass media fi rst and foremost. In a sim-
ilar vein, political outcomes have to be communicated to the public -
again mostly through channels of mass communication. In this sense, to 
speak of modern politics as being mediated is merely 'a descriptive state-
ment' (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 250). It is also based on a rather static 
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understanding of basic fundamentals that fails to capture the ch anging 
interdependent relationships between media and politics. 
Mediatization, in contrast, is an inherently process-oriented concept 
that focuses on how media influence has increased In a number of differ-
ent respects. As such, mediatization is not restricted to politics. Rather, 
it has been conceptualized as being on par with other major societal 
change processes such as modernization, individualization, and glob-
alization (Hjarvard 2008; Krotz 2007; Mazzoleni 2008c). As noted by 
Mazzoleni (2008c: 3053): 
In brief, the concept of 'mediatization of society' Indicates an exten-
sion of the influence of the media into all societal spheres. Therefore, 
it is important to see what the domains are that are influenced by 
the media system (remembering that the media system is both a 
cultural technology and an economic organization). In broad and 
general terms, all the main societal domains are affected by the con-
nection between media and society: sex/gender and generational 
relationships, deviance, control and surveillance, religious and ritual 
dimensions, power relationships, urban environment and city life, 
localization and globalization processes, and so on. 
Following this line of thought, Hjarvard (2008) describes mediatization 
of society as a process whereby 'the media have become integrated into 
the operations of other social institutions, while they also have acquired 
the status of social institutions in their own right' (p. 113). Thus, besides 
involving themselves in other institutions, the media appear increas-
ingly as an autonomous entity with its own institutional logic. This 
process can be observed empirically in the ways in which the media 
intervene in the interaction between individuals within a given institu-
tion, between institutions, and in society at large (Hjarvard 2008). The 
mediatization of politics is thus part of a more general process in highly 
developed, post-industrial mass democracies. The degree of mediatiza-
tion might vary, as the degree of modernization, individualization, and 
globalization also does, but it still affects society- including politics - in 
numerous and fundamental ways. At its core, mediatization is a process-
oriented concept that is about 'changes associated with communication 
media and their development' (Schulz 2004: 88) or, to quote Hjarvard 
(2008: 113), 'the process whereby society to an increasing degree is 
submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic.' 
It is assumed that, like with globalization, more and more regions 
and cultures will be affected by mediatization, but there will also 
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be considerable differences in the influence mediatlzation exerts. 
Globalization is related to mediatization in at least two ways, as Hjarvard 
(2008: 113) points out: 'on the one hand, globalization presumes the 
existence of the technical means to extend communication and interac-
tion over long distances and, on the other hand, it propels the process 
of mediatization by institutionalizing mediated communication and 
interaction in many new contexts'. It is important to emphasize that 
neither mediatization nor globalization are coercively consistent, linear, 
or teleological, as Horkheimer and Adorno (1969) showed for another 
meta-process, enlightenment (Krotz 2007). It can thus be an oppor-
tunity as well as a problem for societies. Whether mediatization has 
positive or negative consequences is an open empirical question and 
cannot be determined in a priori set terms. It depends on a range of fac-
tors that also describe the varieties found in contemporary democracies 
(see Chapter 4). 
Blumler and Kavanagh's (1999: 211) early definition of mediatization 
as 'the media moving toward the center of the social process' can be 
specified insofar as the media provide a commons for society, a shared 
forum of communication that other institutions and actors increasingly 
use as arenas for their interaction (Hjarvard 2008). Within the model of 
representative democracy as laid out in Chapter 3 the media not only 
occupy the public sphere but have become its dominant occupant. The 
consequences of a public sphere that is regulated by media logic can 
be captured theoretically within the framework of neo-institutionalism 
(Donges 2006, 2008; Jarren 1996; Marcinkowski 2005, 2007). 
Mediatization of politics: An institutionalist perspective 
In the course of the development from mediation to mediatization, the 
mass media are less and less regarded as mere technical channels of com-
munications. Instead, the media are regarded as 'organized actors' (Fox 
News, the New York Times, the BBC, The Sun) which pursue certain goals 
and act in the interest of realizing these goals. For seholars who exam-
ine the mediatization of politics, one group of media organizations is 
particularly relevant - the group of news organizations. 
News organizations can be grouped together as an Inter-organizational 
field. This field can be conceived of as a singular institution because 
its constituent organizations are structured similarly to achieve simi-
lar goals, they follow 'shared rules' of what is considered appropriate 
professional behavior, they operate in the same economic and polit-
ical environments, and above all they adopt the same basic rules of 
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the game when confronted with the question of what is important and 
interesting enough to be considered news (Cook 2006; Scott 1994). Jour-
nalists follow professional rules when they select their stories (criteria 
of newsworthiness), when they interact with news sources (exchange 
of exclusive information for granting publicity), while they incorporate 
norms like objectivity into their news production as a strategic ritual 
(to protect themselves against outside criticism; see Hjarvard 2008). 
Various media outlets constitute the building blocks of the media as 
an institution (which has come to rule the public sphere as depicted 
in Figure 3.2, Chapter 3). The rules and norms that govern the media 
taken as a whole are often more important than what distinguishes 
one media company, outlet, type, or format from another (Altheide and 
Snow 1979, 1988, 1991; Mazzoleni 2008c). This is not to say that there 
are no significant differences between, say, public service news and com-
mercial television news, but rather that the commonalities, from the 
perspective of mediatization, are more important than the differences. 
Stated differently, mediatization means that the media form a system 
in their own right, independent of, although interdependent with, other 
social systems such as the political system (Cook 2005; Hjarvard 2008; 
Marcinkowski and Steiner 2010; Mazzoleni 2008c; Stromback 2008). 
Institutions are generally defined as collections of rules and routines 
identifiable across the organizations that are generally seen within a 
society to preside over a particular social sphere (March and Olsen 
1998). A key argument for treating the media as an institution is one 
of power. Neo-instltutionalism conceptualizes the news media as exert-
ing influence through consonant and cumulative reporting, resulting 
from a professional consensus and comparable routines of how to make 
news (Cook 2005). The core institutional feature of the news media 
is their trans-organizational mode of operation, called 'media logic', 
which refers to the media-specific rules of selecting, interpreting, and 
constructing political news messages. The fact that everyone else in 
society - including politicians, parties, governments - has learnt to 
adjust and adapt to the media logic as the obligatory way of perceiv-
ing and interpreting the world, and acting upon it, has further boosted 
the media's significance (Altheide and Snow 1979). Mediatizatlon then 
can be defined as the growing intrusion of media logic as an institu-
tional rule into other fields where it now supplements (and in extreme 
cases replaces) existing rules for defining appropriate behavior. 
Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) describe mediatized politics as 'poli-
tics that has Jost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central 
functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions 
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with mass media' (p. 250). What turns modern mass media into polit-
ically relevant actors is media logic. This media logic comprises the 
professional production routines in newsrooms where political state-
ments are translated into 'stories', but also technological possibilities 
and constraints, and finally the economic organization of the media 
organization. A transmission of this logic and its establishment in other 
social fields would be a sufficient indicator for the Impact of the media 
that exceeds their original mediating function. Mediatization can thus 
be further defined as a temporal (dynamic) process of media-induced 
change that is characterized by the institutionalization of media logic 
in social spheres that were previously considered separate from the 
mass media (Schrott 2009). In such cases, media logic does not replace 
the original logic but overlays it. Mediatlzation of politics thus refers 
to changes in the decision criteria and action rationales of political 
institutions without turning them into media institutions. 
The neo-institutionalist approach has proved particularly fruitful 
for studying mediatization (Cook 2005, 2006; Donges 2008; Hjarvard 
2008; Marcinkowski 2005, 2007; Sparrow 1999, 2006). Cross-nationally 
speaking one can distinguish different path-dependent models of 
institution-formation, different regulatory cultures of media policy, and 
different institutional arrangements ruling the media-politics inter-
changes. Within each country news-media organizations have become 
more similar to one another as they increasingly sought to differen-
tiate themselves from their political environment. Cook (2005) and 
Sparrow (1999) conceptualize the news media as a social sector at 
least partially autonomous from external pressures and exhibiting some 
degree of internal homogeneity, which taken as a whole is able to 
exert a significant amount of power vis-a-vis other social sectors. Cross-
national differences in how media institutions developed are explained 
with longstanding historical and ongoing struggles in the formation 
of media-politics relationships. The process of institution-formation 
explains why, in each country, the news is rather similar from one 
news outlet to the next. Several factors push news workers toward simi-
lar news within any given country: professional consensus, comparable 
routines of making news, the need under deadline to reduce high uncer-
tainty about what is news, the reliance on standard definers of reality, 
and how public policies and government officials accommodate and 
regulate news workers as a distinct group (Cook 2006). 
The broad acceptance of media logic as a 'rule of the game' (North 
1990: 3) or 'way of life' (Altheide and Snow 1979: 237) gains a structure-
forming quality. From the standpoint of political actors, the mass media 
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are providing a regular and persisting framework through which and 
within which they operate (Sparrow 1999). As an institution, the news 
media constrain the choice sets of political actors. The actions of the 
media thereby guide and channel - or structure - the actions of those 
working in government, public administration, and the various stages 
of the political process (Donges 2008; Jarren 2008a; Marcinkowski 2007; 
Sparrow 2006). From a neo-institutionalist standpoint a key aspect of 
mediatization Is that the media constitute the contextual framework (or 
communicative infrastructure) through which politics presents Itself to 
the public or is represented by news outlets. 
The news media thereby exert important effects on political actors 
but there is an important reciprocal loop in this relationship. Modern-
day politicians have internalized the media's attention rules, production 
routines, and selection criteria, and try to exploit this knowledge for 
attaining political goals. If political actors stage an event in order to get 
media attention, or if they fashion an event in order to fit to the media's 
needs, we speak of a self-mediatization (Meyer 2002). Politicians' instru-
mental use of marketing strategies, proactive news management and 
spin doctoring also fall under this term. 
Self-mediatization of politics 
Understanding self-mediatization is crucial for gaining a complete pic-
ture of the interactional media-politics relationship. At the macro-level, 
the political system and media system are two distinct institutional 
spheres which fulfill divergent functions: the policy making versus the 
news making. However, because democratic politics is dependent on 
legitimacy through continuous public support, political actors (includ-
ing governments, parties, and associations) have a vital interest in 
presenting their programs, goals, and accomplishments on the media 
stage. In fact, the principle of answerability and accountability oblige 
political actors to inform the public of their policies, decisions, and 
plans. To achieve this, actors in the political system have in recent years 
professionalized their self-presentational skills. They did so by setting 
up and upgrading 'media relations' units and staffing them with experts 
whose task it is to tailor all political output to media logic. By way of 
'self-mediatization', politics engages in a process of self-initiated stage-
management and media-friendly packaging. For example, when Tony 
Blair's New Labour government came into power in 1997, it introduced 
decisive changes to the approach of government communication. They 
installed a new Strategic Communications Unit, supplemented with a 
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24-hour media monitoring unit, to assist them with coordinating the 
dissemination of the government's message of the day; they appointed 
friendly former journalists to senior posts in government departments; 
they increased the number of special advisers with an explicit pre-
sentational role; they used new media modes to circumnavigate the 
Whitehall press corps and communicate with relevant parts of the pub-
lic directly, among others. Many of these changes were so fundamental 
th at they became subject to parliamentary inquiries, independent inves-
tigations, and critical media scrutiny (cf. Kuhn 2002; Scammell 2001; 
Seymour-Ure 2002). 
The imperative of professionalizing political publicity holds 'that 
attending to communication through the media is not just an add-on 
to political decisions but is an integral part of the interrelated processes 
of [ ... ] policy-making and government itself' (Blumler and Kavanagh 
1999: 214). In the age of mediatized politics, media logic has recast the 
inner workings of the representative model of democracy (Chapter 3). 
To understand this process analytically, it is useful to distinguish three 
steps in the process of political communication (Meyer 2002; Sarcinelli 
2011): 
• the 'production' of politics at the level of program development, 
problem-solving, bargaining of interests, and decision making; 
• the 'self-representation' of politics at the level of publicizing plans 
and justifying outcomes - increasingly with the help of political 
communication professionals; and 
• the 'media representation' of politics in the form of news reports. 
Within our model of representative democracy (Figure 3.2, Chapter 3), 
the production of politics refers basically to the implementation of pref-
erences, the self-representation of politics, and the media representation 
of politics in the public sphere. Under the conditions of mediatized pol-
itics, self-representation by political actors has gained enormously in 
importance, both in terms of personnel and methods (Esser and Spanier 
2005). Whereas political scientists describe its function innocuously 
as 'communicative representation' (Mansbridge 2009) and journalists 
sometimes pejoratively as 'spin doctoring' (Esser 2008a), we describe it 
as 'self-mediatization', that is, as self-initiated stage-management of pol-
itics by means of strategic communication in an effort to master the 
new rules that govern access to the public sphere (cf. Meyer 2002). It is 
a reflexive response by the political system to media-related changes 
in their institutional environment. This process has therefore also 
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been described as 'reflexive mediatization' whereby political actors take 
advantage of media services, anticipate their effects, and exploit them 
through strategic communication for their own purposes (Marcinkowski 
and Steiner 2010; Schulz 2011). 
The political logic 
Differentiating between the 'production of politics' and 'self-
presentation of politics' within the political system has important 
implications for understanding 'political logic'. Politics can be said to 
be ultimately about who has the right to make authoritative decisions 
and policies for solving problems that require political decisions. Thus, 
while power is an integral and inevitable part of politics, politics is also 
about policies and programs for solving societal problems according to 
various value systems or ideologies. Some might argue that power is the 
ultimate goal, and policy programs and promises are the means to reach 
that goal (Downs 1957). But others might argue that, while power is the 
means, being able to enact policies according to their own value system 
or ideology is the ultimate goal (Sjoblom 1968). The conflict between 
these two positions will probably never be resolved, but it is impor-
tant to recognize that politics cannot be reduced to one dimension only 
(Strombiick 2011; Strombiick and Esser 2009). This has implications for 
defining political logic where three dimensions can be distinguished: 
politics, policy, and polity (Meyer 2002: 11-13; Pennings et al. 2006: 
23-26). This triad has been developed in political science as an ana-
lytical tool to delineate the 'political' from the 'non-political', and to 
distinguish political logic from the logics of other societal spheres like 
economics, sports, or the media (Pennings et al. 2006: 23- 26). This triad 
also provides guidelines for journalists as to how to communicate the 
essential features of political realities comprehensively and authentically 
(Meyer 2002: 1-26). 
Policy aspects 
The policy-related facet refers to the 'production' side of politics. Within 
the model of representative democracy (Chapter 3), the production 
logic of politics dominates the stages of policy making and policy 
implementation. It is prevalent in phases and institutional settings 
that are characterized by coordinating and balancing interests, organiz-
ing negotiations, debating alternative policy choices, devising programs 
through deliberation and collective decisions, reaching consensus, and -
ultimately - finding long-term solutions to substantial issues. 
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Politics aspects 
Politics in contrast is a more power-oriented facet. It refers to the 
'self-presentational' side of politics. It is particularly prevalent when 
politicians seek to gain office in election campaigns or when they, 
once in office, approach governing as a permanent campaign. Formally 
speaking, self-presentational politics is dominant in the stages of inter-
est articulation and preference mobilization, problem definition, policy 
communication, and outcome justification (see Figure 3.2, Chapter 3). 
It must be emphasized that self-presentational politics is not com-
pletely issueless. Its main goal is to garner support for one's program. 
Strategies for achieving this may include political pseudo-events, image 
projections, and symbolic politics. The democratic justifications behind 
presentational politics are to publicly visualize responsiveness, demon-
strate answerability, personalize responsibility, and make account-giving 
a public act. Compared to the production side of poli tics, the presenta-
tional side is more interested in individuals than collectives, short-term 
effect than long-term reflection, front-stage than back-stage, strategy 
than policy, prioritization than objective needs, and gaining support 
than balancing out compromise. 
Polity aspects 
If the first two facets of political logic pertain to the policy and poli-
tics dimension of politics, then polity is the third constituent element 
(see Table 7 .1). It refers to the system of rules regulating the polit-
ical process. Understood as the underlying institutional structure of 
democracy, the polity framework limits what political actors can do. 
Even within a single system many aspects of polity are currently 
undergoing change as democracies move from 'nationalized' to 'dena-
tionalized' entities, from a hierarchical 'government' approach to a 
network-oriented 'governance' approach, or from 'party democracy' to 
'media democracy'. Equally important are those institutional elements 
in the set ups of democratic systems that have remained unchanged. 
Table 7.1 The three constituents of political logic 
Policy aspects 
Polley- and decision-
based 'production' 
of politics 
Political logic 
Politics aspects 
Power- and publicity-gaining 
'self-presentational' politics 
Polity aspects 
Institutional framework 
conditions of politics 
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From an internationally comparative perspective, differences in govern-
ment systems, electoral systems, party systems, and political cultures 
must be accounted for in assessments of political logic as these insti-
tutional polity elements have direct implications for the policy and 
politics dimensions in a given country. 
As Marcinkowski (2005) has argued convincingly, not all politi-
cal institutions within a single system are equally prone to being 
mediatized - only those where opportunity structures allow for the 
political logic being complemented, overlaid, or replaced by media logic. 
Institutions that are dependent on public support and therefore guided 
by self-presentational logic will be affected the most. The US polity 
environment and the typical US-style election campaign, for example, 
offer multiple opportunities for accommodating media logic, and candi-
dates and their advisers will see their electoral chances rather enhanced 
than threatened by adapting their operations to media logic. In con-
trast, Swiss-style direct-democratic votes on policy issues are a different 
matter - and somewhat less prone to mediatization - because the pol-
icy dimension of issue deliberation and the polity element of consensus 
democracy balance out the self-presentational element of the campaign 
process. Political institutions least likely to be affected by mediatization 
are those guided almost exclusively by the production logic of politics, 
for example confidential negotiating committees. Should media logic 
interfere with delicate negotiations nonetheless, it is likely to disrupt or 
even obstruct their way of working. 
The media logic 
Altheide and Snow (1979) introduced the term media logic and 
described it as a specific 'format'. Format defines how material is 
organized, the style of presentation, the focus or emphasis, and the 
'grammar' of the mediated communication (Altheide and Snow 1979: 
10). The main aspects of format are the selection, organization, and pre-
sentation of information, as Altheide (1995: 11) later explained. Media 
logic can thus be understood as a particular way of covering and inter-
preting social, cultural, and political phenomena. It encompasses all 
those imperatives that guide the production of news that - from the 
standpoint of the general public - serves as an authoritative represen-
tation of the political reality. This can create a very real tension with 
political logic. 
News-media logic, like political logic, consists of a combination of sev-
eral elements (Hallin and Mancini 2004a; Mazzoleni 2008d). The most 
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Table 7.2 The th rec constituents of news-media logic 
Professlo11al aspects 
News-production 
according to 
distinctively 
journalistic norms 
and criteria 
News-media logic 
Commercial aspects 
News-production 
acco.rding to economically 
motivated rationales 
Teclmological aspects 
Medium-specific 
technological conditions 
of news-production 
important constituents are p f . 1 . 
followed by technological ch:on;~s~~~ea ~~~~~o~ ;;dT~om~nerc~aliza~ion, 
ent forces of the news m d. , . · · 1ey escnbe d1ffer-
political logic - a hybridec~~~~pptetrhat1tng logbi~, making media logic - like 
h a com mes three sub con t All 
t ree are assumed to causally influence the cult f - cep s. . 
in individual media organizations and in d" ul re o n.ews production M . me 1a nstitutions as a whole 
ore importantly, they are considered to be chief\ . . 
torical process of greater differentiation of the :e~:spons1ble :or a his-~~~~~: ;.:,~~~~s~d thus help explain the <elations~i~y;::.,~0~,:: 
iti::s~~~~nt~~~e ~!~~~~c~~~~:~e ~elati?nship between media and pol-~~~~,~~:,;~::',~:".~:el' wh~h p,::~i~~~~~~:~ ~~;::n~~:::~x.·:~~ 
across norther~ contine:::~lcra c corporatist model', which is located 
which is found in th M d~urope, and the 'p~larized pluralist model', 
B 
. fl d e e iterranean countries of Southern Europe. 
ne y state , 
:~:c~i:e~al Mod~l is characterized by a relative dominance of market 
msms an of commercial media; the Democratic . ~~d,el by a hlstodc~I coexistence of commen:ial media ~~J~:~:: 
~~t l~~;l;a;;:: ~oc1~l a~d political groups, and by a relatively active 
by "nt ti e ro e o the state; and the Polarized Pluralist Model 
dev~lo;~:n~~f~~::::e:~:li~~~~~ ~ardty politics, weaker historical 
1 n a strong role of the state. 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004a: 11) 
vers1 yo pohtJcal systems (see Chapter 4) d"ff According to the di ·t f .. 
patterns in media-political relations have emerged that are of' : erent 
for understanding different shades of media logic. re evance 
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Professional aspects 
Professionalization of journalism means that journalism is differenti-
ated as an occupation and institution from other social institutions, 
particularly politics, and follows a distinct common culture and distinct 
sense of social purpose. Here we follow the argumentation of Hallin and 
Mancini (2004a, 2004b) who distinguish three dimensions. 
Professionalism means growing autonomy from outside influences 
and outside control over one's work. In liberal and democratic-
corporatlst media systems, journalism has achieved autonomy at a faster 
rate and to a greater extent than in polarized-pluralist systems. In liberal 
and democratic-corporatist systems, this helped erode press/party par-
allelism. In polarized-pluralist systems, journalists have been subject to 
political instrumentalization, or even control, to a certain extent until 
today, and are thus more likely to lack a set of professional practices that 
is different from political logic. 
Professionalism means, secondly, a distinct set of professional norms 
like protecting sources, separating news and advertisements, and - most 
importantly - common rules for selecting material. News factors like 
timeliness, proximity, surprise, conflict, harm, personalization, or elite 
involvement have emerged as universally accepted criteria for determin-
ing newsworthiness. Interestingly, norms that signal clear distance to a 
partisan-political logic (like objectivity, neutrality, fourth estate, watch-
dog) gained broad acceptance first in liberal systems, from where they 
diffused later into democratic-corporatist systems (but more often as 
an ideal than a practice). In democratic-corporatist systems, journalistic 
norms that are in accordance with political logic (like advocacy, pro-
portional representation of viewpoints, civic education) also prevailed. 
In polarized-pluralist systems, partisan-political rather than distinctively 
journalistic criteria continue to guide news work. 
Professionalism means, thirdly, a claim to serve the public Interest. 
Being recognized by society as a 'public trust' is an important histor-
ical development in the professionalization of journalism. It assigns 
certain democratic functions to the news media that are crucial for 
the chain of responsibility and accountability (see Chapter 3), like 
contributing to enlightened understanding through substantive and 
uncensored information, contributing to public deliberation and opin-
ion formation through diverse and inclusive issue debates, monitoring 
the political environment and alerting citizens to important and poten-
tially dangerous developments, as well as facilitating the communicative 
exchange between the governed and the governing and holding the 
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latter accountable in case of misconduct or underperformance. Serving 
as a public trust justifies certain legal privileges and eases journalists' 
relations with sources and other social Institutions. Even in liberal sys-
tems, the 'social responsibility model' of journalism served as a guiding 
principle from the beginning (aiming at providing information that is 
important for informed citizenship and rational participation, rather 
than information that the political elite allows to be known), but already 
in the 1940s the US Hutchinson Commission of the Press (1947) saw this 
principle compromised by commercial influences (to which we turn in 
the next section). 
Yet there is another aspect of media professionalism that deserves 
attention : journalistic voice (Zaller 1999). Journalists want to be more 
than mere mouthpieces of politicians and would rather contro l, frame, 
and interpret the flow of political communication themselves. Accord-
ing to inner-professional standards, an excellent piece of journalism 
is one that is rich in journalistic interpretation and critical analysis. 
This enhances peer recognition, professional prestige - and is intellectu-
ally more rewarding. Thus, journalists have an interest in creating and 
selling a form of journalism that offers more than stenographic tran-
scription of what others have said, or one that appeals to the lowest 
common denominator of the mass market. What journalists add should 
be, in their Ideal, as arresting and manifestly Important as possible - so 
as to call attention to journalists and to the importance of their work 
(Zaller 1999). 
This understanding of professional journalism as an autonomous, 
value-added process underwent a shift in the late 1960s toward 'critical 
professionalism' (first in liberal systems, later in democratic corporatist 
systems). A new Ideal of critical scrutiny emerged that concentrated 
on blunders in political strategy and mistakes in governing (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004b; Neveu 2002). Critical journalists will, for every political 
statement, seek a counter-statement from an opponent, thus creating a 
more confrontational climate in media-politics relations (Westerstahl 
and Johannson 1986). Critical professionalism grew out of increased 
levels of education (leading to more reflexivity and analysis in news 
reporting) and a general shift toward post-materialist values. Combined 
with new opportunities of opinion-polling it contributed to the emer-
gence of a new, self-assured role-understanding: a self-perception of 
journalism as the (better) representative of the public will (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004b; Patterson 2009). 
This new style of more assertive, skeptical reporting and interpre-
tation turned at times adversarial when journalists felt threatened in 
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their reporting options. In order to protect their professional integrity 
and their public image as an independent institution, journalists grew 
increasingly critical toward proactive news management and manipula-
tive message control by political communication experts responsible for 
the self-representation of politics. The self-mediatlzation of politics led 
to 'countermeasures' like negative, deconstructive, or even cynical news 
(Blumler 1999; Kerbel 1999; Zaller 1999), and contributed in the US and 
Western Europe to a 'demontage of politics' in public affairs coverage 
(Kepplinger 1998; Patterson 1993) . 
We can thus distinguish several effects of professional imperatives on 
political news coverage: 
• gatekeeping and reporting according to news values (instead of 
political values); 
• controlling access to the mediated public sphere (by selecting voices 
and standpoints according to news values); 
• agenda setting (by selecting and prioritizing issues according to news 
values); 
• balanced reporting (incorporating counter-standpoints, dissociating 
journalism from being a political mouthpiece); 
• interpretative, analytical reporting (dissociating journalism from 
being a political mouthpiece; contributing to informed citizenship; 
participating actively in public opinion formation; inserting critical 
expertise); 
• critical watchdog reporting (observing public-interest obligation like 
account-holding, creating transparency, demanding answerability; 
but also inserting critical professionalism); 
• adversarial attack-dog reporting (coun tering attempts of political 
instrumentalization; but also incorporating critical professionalism). 
Many of these professional aspects refer to the news media in their 
role of an independen t representative of the public that may pressur-
ize officials - according to its own standards and operating logic - to 
be responsive to those very demands it has made public in the first 
place, and evaluate them accordingly. As either a publicly recognized 
or a mere self-appointed account-holder it can sanction officials with 
good or bad press. Mediatlzation theory expects that with increasing 
professionalization the news media assume a more autonomous, proac-
tive role within core processes of representative democracy - those of 
responsibility and accountability (see Chapter 3). 
Frank Esser 171 
Commercial aspects 
Commercialization as the second core constituent of media logic has 
a strained relationship with professionalization. Journalists in many 
news orga nizations traditionally have insisted on a principal separation 
between the newsroom on the one side and the business departments 
(advertising, marketing, owner interests) on the other. They did so in 
an effort to preserve their autonomy against commercial forces. Yet, 
under the influence of growing neo-liberalism and deregulation in most 
Western media systems, news organizations have lost autonomy in rela-
tion to the market at the same time as they became more detached 
from the political system. Put differently, commercialization pushed 
news organizations further away from the world of politics but more 
toward the world of business. As a result, Hallin and Mancini (2004a) 
state, 'the journalist's main objective is no longer to disseminate ideas 
and create social consensus around them, but to produce entertainment 
and information that can be sold to individual consumers' (p. 277). 
They fur ther argue that commercial imperatives are most pronounced 
in the media logic of liberal systems, and that in recent times more and 
more media organizations in the democratic-corporatist and polarized-
plura list systems have fallen under their influence too. Yet one could 
make the argument that, for example, in democratic-corporatist systems 
public service broadcasters and quali ty newspapers are still more driven 
by professional than commercial considerations - although even they 
could not escape the transformational effects of the 'commercial deluge' 
since the mid 1980s (Hallin and Mancini 2004a: 252). 
Mazzoleni (2008b, 2008c; see also Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Hallin 
and Mancini 2004a: 278-281) distinguish es several effects of commer-
cial imperatives on political communication: 
• spectacularization (playing up sensational or uncommon features of 
political events); 
• confrontainment (focusing on conflict rather than compromise, 
scandal rather than investigation); 
• dramatization (relying on emotionalization, visualization , polariza-
tion, and stereotyping for storytelling; adopting 'game schema' and 
'horse race frames' in election coverage); 
• infotainment (packaging political news in appealing formats by using 
'soft news' angles and 'episodic framing'; emphasizing the 'common 
citizen' perspective by privileging ordinary citizens and common 
sense over elite discourse and party representatives); 
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• personalization (attributing political activity to individuals as 
opposed to parties and institutions; constructing political news 
around persons with their own temperaments, charisma, looks, 
idiosyncrasies, ideas; pressurizing political institutions to presiden-
tialize their leadership style and recruit more personnel with tele-
genic image, popular rhetoric, and marketable messages); 
• transformation of discourse (favoring 'sound bite news' that frag-
ments the political discourse in brief, catchy phrases, and 'image bite 
news' that relies on compelling visuals); 
• depoliticization (marginalizing substantial issue discussion since it 
is considered a turnoff in race for ratings and profit; strategic 
Instead of issue framing; reducing national and international policy 
coverage). 
It must be emphasized that some of these indicators have actually 
a 'professional' core but have been overlaid with a 'commercial' logic. 
A case in point is confrontainment. A focus on conflict and scandal is of 
high commercial 'animation value' but, at the same time, connected 
to the rise of critical professionalism. Confrontainment can thus be 
said to reflect a commercially motivated exaggeration of the profession-
ally motivated watchdog function. Put differently, confrontainment is 
driven simultaneously by the desire of media organizations to com-
pete for audience, and by the desire of journalists to build professional 
prestige and assert their independence vis-a-vis political actors. Other 
hybrid elements of media logic, combining commercial and professional 
imperatives, include negative tonality, or strategic reporting. 
Mediatization theory recognizes that commercial influences may 
have a certain liberating, mobilizing effect on media and politics, and 
also open up new possibilities. By and large, however, proponents 
point to potentially detrimental effects for representative democracy -
particularly with regard to the role of the news media in chains of 
responsibility and accountabili ty. They fear that commercial impera-
tives of media logic lead to an insufficient supply of substance in public 
affairs coverage that no longer allows for an adequate understanding 
and evaluation of available policy options. They further suspect that 
commercial media logic will discourage political interest, subvert politi-
cal knowledge, and disadvantage the formation of informed opinions as 
well as the deliberation of key issues. The media may become unreliable 
or altogether unhelpful in assessing whether policy-makers' decisions 
match citizens' preferences. A decline in transparent and comprehen-
sive policy coverage may further undermine the media's capacity to act 
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as an institutionalized account-holder; its specific kind of coverage may 
even discourage citizens to get involved themselves, check on their rep-
resentatives, and fight for their interests. We will expand this discussion 
further in Chapter 8 and, at this point, move on to the third component 
of the hybrid concept of media logic, technology. 
Technological aspects 
A third element of media logic is technology. It refers to how the 
applied communication technologies shape content in production and 
reproduction processes. The ways in which radio, television , print, and 
internet translate political reality into story 'formats' is influenced by 
the physical nature of their respective information technology. Tech-
nology pressures the news practitioners embedded within them to adopt 
certain formats - television formats for instance are arguably more lin-
ear, more visual, more affective, and less cognitively complex than print 
formats. 
A core question is what the advent of new online media will con-
tribute to the present understand ing of mediatizatlon . With its open-
ness, interactive structure, and flexibility, the internet creates new 
opportunities for bottom-up communication, for the expression of pub-
lic preferences, for participation in policy making, and for holding 
political actors accountable for their actions (through e-consultation, 
online petitions, alternative biogs, citizen journalists; see Coleman and 
Blumler 2009; Brants and Voltmer 2011). The interactive, participatory 
logic of the internet has also created new opportunities for countering 
the traditional top-down communication of existing print and broad-
cast media: new websites - either by news aggregators or alternative 
suppliers - increasingly threaten the business model of legacy media, 
the professional model of journalism, and the traditional understand-
ing of political news (Brants and Voltmer 2011). Sobering aspects of 
this new interactive online logic are that its participatory and delib-
erative potential has rarely been realized so far, that its potential of 
creating multiple public spheres has rather increased fragmentation and 
polarization, and that it thus far has enriched popular culture more 
than institutionalized politics (Dahlgren 2009; Hindman 2009). How-
ever, it must be also emphasized that the internet has had only modest 
success in displacing traditional media sources (Hindman 2009), and 
there is strong evidence that the med iatization effects of the old media 
will endure in the new. By this we mean that online news providers 
may only resonate professionally and commercially in the long run if 
their content follows a similar media logic to their offline counterparts. 
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Some observers thus expect a convergence process whereby old and new 
media operate alongside each other with a singular, merged media logic 
(Schulz 2004). The central conclusion at the moment is that both tradi-
tional news media logic and new interactive online logic seem to 'imply 
a process whereby established communication elites are losing their abil-
ity to control the public debate and the way in which political issues are 
framed' (Brants and Voltmer 2011: 11). 
Conclusion 
We conclude our discussion of political logic by reiterating that political 
logic consists of three facets (Table 7.1): The two more prominent ones 
are the policy-oriented 'production side' and the politics-oriented 'self-
presentational side'. The third facet, the polity-oriented 'institutional 
side', is somewhat beneath the surface of day-to-day politics but conse-
quential for its execution. It is crucial to understand that most political 
events and processes are composed of all three facets, and public com-
munication about them will need to reflect all three facets if it aims 
to meet the requirements of responsibility and accountability as laid in 
Chapter 3. This would be the yardstick for covering politics according to 
political logic: news media would be expected to pay tribute to all three 
aspects of the political in their public affairs coverage (Meyer 2002). 
It would facilitate an 'enlightened understanding' of politics which is 
necessary for citizens to form their preferences and recognize whether 
political decisions correspond with their preferences or not (important 
elements of the chain of responsibility in our model of representative 
democracy; see Chapter 3). Transparent and comprehensive information 
allows citizens also to better evaluate the performance of policy-makers 
and sanction them in case they do not meet expected standards (which 
are important elements of the chain of accountability). 
It is an unresolved scholarly debate whether or not to demand of the 
media the 'full' democratic standard or a 'reduced' standard in their 
public political affairs coverage (Bennett 2003; Patterson 2003; Zaller 
2003), yet most agree that citizens can only acquire relevant informa-
tion from the media about politics if the media report on the political 
process in all its diverse dimensions and facets (Meyer 2002; Sarcinelli 
2011). The degree to which the media cover politics according to politi-
cal logic or media logic is a core question of mediatization research . It is 
another open question that can only be answered by empirical stud-
ies of concrete cases whether the intrusion of media logic leads to an 
enhancement, adaptation, obstruction or even substitution of political 
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functions (Marcinkowski 2005). The composition of political logic (i.e. 
the proportion of its three facets) behind an event or within an institu-
tion predetermines its chance of being mediatized, and predetermines 
the concrete mediatization effect . This leads Marcinkowski (2005: 364) 
to argue that a democratic system will never be mediatized in toto but 
rather be distinguished 'by islands of higher and lower mediatization' . 
Media logic affects the front-stage part of political activity ('politics') 
more easily and forcefully than the back-stage part (genuine 'policy 
making'). One should thus refrain from making sweeping assumptions 
about transformations of the entire model of representative democracy 
(see Figure 3.2, Chapter 3) without detailed, comprehensive analyses of 
all political institutions and processes. It should further be taken into 
account that we are confronted with a variety of democratic settings in 
the West (Chapter 4), each offering different entry points and defense 
barriers to media influences. 
We conclude our discussion of media logic by reiterating that its 
three facets are professional, commercial, and technological aspects (see 
Table 7.2). Over time, commercialization helped push news organiza-
tions further away from the world of politics and more toward the 
world of economics. It has had the additional effect of eroding various 
elements of journalistic professionalism in the long run. 
Professionalization, commercialization, and technological change are 
the independent variables that explain (or drive) media logic but it is 
important to recognize that these processes have developed differently 
in different countries and across time. It follows that media logic appears 
in diverse shades and compositions across types of media channels and 
genres, and across time periods and media systems. For example, private 
television stations and tabloid newspapers in a highly commercialized 
media market (like contemporary US) are likely to be guided by a more 
commercially driven composition of media logic than public service 
channels and quality newspapers in the Scandinavian countries of the 
1960s. The difference in media logic between public broadcasters and 
highbrow quality newspapers on the one hand and commercial broad-
casters and lowbrow popular newspapers on the other hand may in 
certain fields be weaker than is theoretically often assumed (Esser 2008b; 
Stromback and Dimitrova 2011). 
Our tripartite differentiation of facets of media logic allows for more 
precise predictions about the mediatization of politics in different 
contexts. But it must be emphasized that the concrete effects of media-
tization on politics depend on the respective policy, process, and polity 
conditions. Based on these theoretical founda tions (and the necessary 
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differentiations between different kinds of political and media arrange-
ments) the followi ng Chapter 8 turns to concrete empirical evidence 
gathered by colleagues inside and outside NCCR Democracy. It will con-
clude with an overall assessment of implications of the mediatization of 
politics for representative democracy. 
8 
Mediatization Effects on Political 
News, Political Actors, Political 
Decisions, and Political Audiences 
Frank Esser and f org Matthes 
We define mediatization as the growing intrusion of media logic as 
an institutional rule into fields where other rules of defining appro-
priate behavior prevailed (see Chapter 7). Mediatization can lead to an 
enhancement, adaptation, obstruction, or even substitution of politi-
cal functions by the logic of the med ia system. At its extreme it can 
lead to a state of 'mediatized politics' where politics 'has lost its auton-
omy, bas become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and 
is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media' (Mazzoleni 
and Schulz 1999: 250). The professional, commercial, and technologi-
cal production rules of the media - its operating logic - are important 
requiremen ts which political actors must take into account if they are 
to receive publicity, public support, and legitimacy. Media logic provides 
an incentive structure that contextualizes, and often shapes, political 
processes - particularly those that are dependent on publicity and pub-
lic support. From this it follows that - contrary to a priori assumptions 
of a fully transformed 'media democracy' - the concept of mediatization 
does not assume a complete 'colonialization' of politics by the media. 
Rather we expect that some institutions, stages, and activities in the 
political process will be mediatized more than others, depending on 
how media-compatible they are (Marcinkowski 2005). Those character-
ized by the power- and publicity-gaining self-presentational aspects of 
political logic are more likely to be affected by media logic than those 
characterized by the policy- and decision-based production aspects. Put 
simply: political institutions in need of publicity are easier to mediatlze 
than others (Marcinkowski and Steiner 2010). 
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